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The appellant's private psychiatrist warned 
Hartford that she had attempted suicide 
previously and that having to submit to a 
second exam might cause further psycho-
logical stress. Four days after the required 
psychiatric exam, the appellant attempted 
suicide. She then brought suit alleging 
that Hartford "intended to inflict emo-
tional distress in order to cause her to drop 
the claim or commit suicide." Young, 303 
Md. at 189. There was no claim in this suit 
of medical malpractice, and in fact, the ex-
amining physician found that her emo-
tional trauma was real and compensable. 
The court of appeals ruled that this allega-
tion of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress satisfied the criteria of Art. 101 
§ 44 and allowed her to bring a common 
law action against Hartford. 
Sterry is the third in a series of recent 
cases which demonstrate the Maryland 
courts' willingness to limit the scope of the 
exclusivity clause. In Young v. Hartford, 
supra, and a similar case decided the same 
day, Gallagher v. Bituminous Fire and Ma-
rine Insurance Co., 303 Md. 201 492 A.2d 
1280 (1985), the court held that a claim of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress 
by the employer is not precluded from a 
civil tort action. Several months later, in 
Sterry, the court allowed the plaintiff to 
evade the "universally held" doctrine that 
medical malpractice in a workmen's com-
pensation case is exclusively compensable 
under the Act. By permitting a semantic 
manipulation alleging intentional medical 
malpractice, the court appears to provide 
another manner of egress from the con-
fines of the exclusivity clause. 
-Malinda S. Siegel 
Liscombe v. Potomac Edison Co.: 
CONTRmUTORY NEGLIGENCE-
STILL A COMPLETE BAR TO 
RECOVERY 
In Liscombe v. Potomac Edison Co., 
303 Md. 619, 495 A.2d 838 (1985), the 
Maryland Court of Appeals held that a 
dump truck operator who was aware of 
overhead power lines, but nevertheless was 
electrically shocked when his truck came 
in close proximity to the lines, was guilty 
of contributory negligence as a matter of 
law. In so holding, the court affirmed the 
lower court's decision to grant the defen-
dants' motions for summary judgment. 
In Liscombe the plaintiff, Robert D. 
Liscombe, received a severe electric shock 
when he raised the bed of his tractor-trailer 
dump truck into overhead electric lines be-
longing to the defendant, Potomac Edi-
son. The injury occurred while Liscombe 
was delivering a load of sand to the co-
defendant, Hagerstown Block, on property 
owned by Martin-Marietta. Liscombe filed 
suit against Potomac Edison and Hagers-
town Block for compensatory and punitive 
damages for his injuries allegedly sustained 
because of the defendants' gross negli-
gence. Motions for summary judgment 
were filed by Potomac Edison and Hagers-
town Block on the ground that Liscombe 
was contributorily negligent as a matter of 
law. The circuit court granted the defen-
dants' motions for summary judgment, and 
Liscombe appealed to the court of special 
appeals. The court of appeals granted cer-
tiorari before any consideration by the 
intermediate appellate court. 
On appeal Liscombe alleged that the 
trial court erred in finding contributory 
negligence as a matter of law, and in the 
alternative that contributory negligence is 
not a defense where the tort is alleged to be 
based on wanton or reckless conduct. Lis-
combe also contended that the trial court 
erred in refusing to permit the issue oflast 
clear chance to go to the jury. 
Liscombe claimed that there were three 
areas of disputed facts which compel the 
issue of contributory negligence to be de-
termined by the trier offact. First, whether 
he had knowledge of a similar accident 
which occurred one month prior to his in-
jury. Second, whether his truck actually 
touched the wires or whether the electrical 
shock was caused by an arcing effect with-
out contact. Third, whether the sunlight 
affected his ability to see the wires at the 
time of the accident. The court dismissed 
these contentions as immaterial, and found 
that Liscombe knew of the presence and 
inherent danger presented by the wires 
and that this was enough to establish his 
negligence. 
The court relied on its decision in State 
v. Potomac Edison Company, 166 Md. 
138, 170 A. 568 (1934), in deciding that 
the undisputed facts were sufficient to find 
Liscombe guilty of contributory negli-
gence as a matter of law. In this case the 
court held that "[i]f [the injured person] 
knew or should have known that the wire 
was dangerous, it follows as of course that 
he was negligent in touching it, or in com-
ing near enough to it to receive the shock." 
Id., at 147,170 A. at 571. The court went 
on to identify three elements, as stated in 
Stancill v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 744 
F.2d 861 (D.C. Cir. 1984), which must be 
established before the plaintiff can be 
deemed negligent because he assumed the 
risk. The plaintiff must have "(1) had 
knowledge of the risk of danger, (2) appre-
ciated that risk and (3) voluntarily exposed 
himself to it." /d. at 866. 
While the court in Stancill spoke in 
terms of assumption of risk, in the case at 
bar the court held these elements also 
prove negligence in cases involving elec-
trical accidents. The court went on to state 
that in Maryland, electrical accident cases 
have historically fallen under the contrib-
utory negligence theory rather than as-
sumption of risk. 
After determining that the plaintiff vol-
untarily exposed himself to the admittedly 
dangerous wires and thus his own negli-
gence contributed to his injury, the court 
addressed whether the defendants were 
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grossly negligent. The court held that 
once it was established that Liscombe was 
contributorily negligent as a matter oflaw 
it was up to Liscombe to prove gross negli-
gence on the part of the defendants. Evi-
dence at trial showed that the defendants 
were aware of the dangerous position of 
the overhead lines, because one month be-
fore a similar, less serious, accident oc-
curred. However, the court found that 
Potomac and Hagerstown acted reasonably 
in trying to prevent further accidents. The 
evidence showed red flags had been hung 
from the wires, oral warnings were given 
to all trucks entering the plant, and Po-
tomac had staked out a new route for the 
wires. After an examination of the facts, 
the court found the defendants acted rea-
sonably under the situation and were not 
guilty of gross negligence. 
The court dismissed Liscombe's last ar-
gument, that the issue oflast clear chance 
should have been left for the jury, by hold-
ing the doctrine inapplicable in this case. 
The court, citing Sanner v. Suard, 236 
Md. 271, 203 A.2d 885 (1964), held that 
in Maryland the last clear chance doctrine 
has no application when the negligence of 
the plaintiff is concurrent with the negli-
gence of the defendant, and the defendant 
had no opportunity to avoid the accident 
after the original negligence. In the case at 
bar no such opportunity was afforded to 
the defendants. 
The court of appeals' decision in Lis-
combe v. Potomac Edison Co. reaffirms the 
Maryland judiciary's position that a plain-
tiff guilty of negligence, however slight, is 
completely barred from recovery. The 
burden placed upon the defendant in elec-
trical shock cases is slight. In the absence 
of wanton or reckless conduct on the part 
of the defendant, a person who knew or 
should have known that a wire is danger-
ous, and puts himself close enough to it to 
receive a shock, is contributorily negligent 
as a matter of law and is thus barred from 
recovery. 
-Stephen Markey 
American Federation of State, 
County, and Munidpal Employees v. 
State of Washington: NINTH 
CIRCUIT REJECTS COMPARABLE 
WORTH 
In American Federation of State, County, 
and Municipal Employees v. State of Wash-
ington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985), the 
United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit held that the state's decision 
to base compensation on the competitive 
market rather than on a theory of com-
parable worth did not establish its liability 
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under a disparate impact analysis. The 
court held that the state's participation in 
the market system did not allow the infer-
ence of discriminatory motive so as to es-
tablish its liability under a disparate treat-
ment theory, since the state did not create 
the market disparity and was not shown to 
have been motivated by impermissible sex-
based considerations in setting salaries. 
The State of Washington was sued in the 
United States District Court for the West-
ern District of Washington by two unions: 
the American Federation of State, County, 
and Municipal Employees, (AFSCME), and 
the Washington Federation of State Em-
ployees, (WFSE), on behalf of a class of 
15,500 state employees who work or have 
worked in jobs consisting of at least seventy 
percent female employees. The district 
court found that the state discriminated on 
the basis of sex by compensating employees 
in predominately female jobs at lower rates 
than employees in predominately male 
jobs, where the jobs were found to be al-
though dissimilar, of comparable worth to 
the employer. The district court found 
Washington State in violation of Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.c. 
§ 200e-2(a) (1982). 
The State of Washington sets its em-
ployee salaries at rates comparable to the 
prevailing market rates in the public and 
private sectors. Market rates are deter-
mined by a process of surveys, hearings, 
and state budget analyses. In 1974, the 
state conducted a wage disparity study en-
titled "The Willis Study" which found a 
wage disparity of about twenty percent to 
the disadvantage of employees in jobs held 
predominately by women for jobs of com-
parable worth held predominately by men. 
Comparable worth was determined by a 
four-prong test: knowledge and skills, men-
tal demands, accountability, and working 
conditions. Similar surveys were con-
ducted in 1976 and 1980. In 1983, the 
state adopted a ten-year plan to correct the 
disparity. 
The district court ordered immediate 
implementation of a system of compensa-
tion based on comparable worth as well as 
back pay. The district court based its de-
termination of sex discrimination on two 
theories: disparate impact and dispa~ate 
treatment. Disparate impact discrimina-
tion involves a facially neutral employ-
ment practice that, without business justi-
fication, has a disproportionately adverse 
impact upon members of a group protected 
under Title VII. Proof of intent is not re-
quired, because, where a practice is spe-
cific and focused, the question is whether 
the employer's explanation for the com-
pensation policy reveals that it is a pretext 
for discrimination. For disparate treat-
ment analysis, discriminatory intent is an 
essential element. Under the disparate 
treatment theory, to establish intent, it is 
insufficient for the plaintiff to show that 
the employer was merely aware of the ad-
verse consequences of a compensation pol-
icy. The plaintiff must show that the em-
ployer chose the policy, at least partly, 
because of its adverse effects. 
